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In Akron I, 462 U. S. 416 (1983), we invalidated an ì ordinance which required that a woman seeking an abortion be ì provided by her physician with specific information designed to ì influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or ì childbirth. Id., at 444. As we later described the Akron I ì holding in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and ì Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 762, there were two purported flaws ì in the Akron ordinance: the information was designed to dissuade ì the woman from having an abortion and the ordinance imposed a ì rigid requirement that a specific body of information be givenin ì all cases, irrespective of the particular needs of the ì patient . . . . Ibid. To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find ì a constitutional violation when the government requires, as it ì does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information ì about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and ì those of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the ì fetus, those cases go too far, are inconsistent with Roe's ì acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life, and ì are overruled. This is clear even on the very terms of Akron I ì and Thornburgh. Those decisions, along with Danforth, recognize ì a substantial government interest justifying a requirement that a ì woman be apprised of the health risks of abortion and childbirth. ì E.g., Danforth, supra, at 66-67. It cannot be questioned that ì psychological well-being is a facet of health. Nor can it be ì doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem the ì impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the ì decision. In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the ì full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the ì legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an ì abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological ì consequences, that her decision was not fully informed. If the ì information the State requires to be made available to the woman ì is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be ì permissible. /* Ordinarily "the marketplace of ideas" would be allowed to ì determine what is truth. Here the Court presumes that the state ì will know to confine itself to the "truth" a reahter elusive ì standard and one which invites litigation. */ We also see no reason why the State may not require ì doctors to inform a woman seeking an abortion of the availability ì of materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when ì those consequences have no direct relation to her health. An example illustrates the point. We would think it ì constitutional for the State to require that in order for there ì to be informed consent to a kidney transplant operation the ì recipient must be supplied with information about risks to the ì donor as well as risks to himself or herself. A requirement that ì the physician make available information similar to that mandated ì by the statute here was described in Thornburgh as an outright ì attempt to wedge the Commonwealth's message discouraging abortion ì into the privacy of the informed-consent dialogue between the ì woman and her physician. 476 U. S., at 762. We conclude, ì however, that informed choice need not be defined in such narrow ≡7É3 ìèterms that all considerations of the effect on the fetus are made ì irrelevant. As we have made clear, we depart from the holdings ì of Akron I and Thornburgh to the extent that we permit a State to ì further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn ì by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is ì mature and informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a ì preference for childbirth over abortion. In short, requiring ì that the woman be informed of the availability of information ì relating to fetal development and the assistance available should ì she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable ì measure to insure an informed choice, one which might cause the ì woman to choose childbirth over abortion. This requirement ì cannot be considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an ì abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden. Our prior cases also suggest that the strait- jacket, ì Thornburgh, supra, at 762 (quoting Danforth, supra, at 67, n. 8), ì of particular information which must be given in each case ì interferes with a constitutional right of privacy between a ì pregnant woman and her physician. As a preliminary matter, it is ì worth noting that the statute now before us does not require a ì physician to comply with the informed consent provisions if he or ì she can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, that he ì or she reasonably believed that furnishing the information would ì have resulted in a severely adverse effect on the physical or ì mental health of the patient. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3205 (1990). ì In this respect, the statute does not prevent the physician from ì exercising his or her medical judgment. Whatever constitutional status the doctor- patient ì relation may have as a general matter, in the present context it ì is derivative of the woman's position. The doctor-patient ì relation does not underlie or override the two more general ì rights under which the abortion right is justified: the right to ì make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy. On its ì own, the doctor-patient relation here is entitled to the same ì solicitude it receives in other contexts. Thus, a requirement ì that a doctor give a woman certain information as part of ì obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional ì purposes, no different from a requirement that a doctor give ì certain specific information about any medical procedure. All that is left of petitioners' argument is an asserted ì First Amendment right of a physician not to provide information ì about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated ì by the State. To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights ì not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 ì (1977), but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to ì reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. Cf. Whalen v. ì Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 603 (1977). We see no constitutional ì infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the ì information mandated by the State here. The Pennsylvania statute also requires us to reconsider ì the holding in Akron I that the State may not require that a ≡7É3 ìèphysician, as opposed to a qualified assistant, provide ì information relevant to a woman's informed consent. 462 U. S., ì at 448. Since there is no evidence on this record that requiring ì a doctor to give the information as provided by the statute would ì amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman ì seeking an abortion, we conclude that it is not an undue burden. ì Our cases reflect the fact that the Constitution gives the States ì broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be ì performed only by licensed professionals, even if an objective ì assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be performed ì by others. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 ì U. S. 483 (1955). Thus, we uphold the provision as a reasonable ì means to insure that the woman's consent is informed. Our analysis of Pennsylvania's 24-hour waiting period ì between the provision of the information deemed necessary to ì informed consent and the performance of an abortion under the ì undue burden standard requires us to reconsider the premise ì behind the decision in Akron I invalidating a parallel ì requirement. In Akron I we said: Nor are we convinced that the ì State's legitimate concern that the woman's decision be informed ì is reasonably served by requiring a 24-hour delay as a matter of ì course. 462 U. S., at 450. We consider that conclusion to be ì wrong. The idea that important decisions will be more informed ì and deliberate if they follow some period of reflection does not ì strike us as unreasonable, particularly where the statute directs ì that important information become part of the background of the ì decision. The statute, as construed by the Court of Appeals, ì permits avoidance of the waiting period in the event of a medical ì emergency and the record evidence shows that in the vast majority ì of cases, a 24-hour delay does not create any appreciable health ì risk. In theory, at least, the waiting period is a reasonable ì measure to implement the State's interest in protecting the life ì of the unborn, a measure that does not amount to an undue burden. Whether the mandatory 24-hour waiting period is ì nonetheless invalid because in practice it is a substantial ì obstacle to a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy is a ì closer question. The findings of fact by the District Court ì indicate that because of the distances many women must travel to ì reach an abortion provider, the practical effect will often be a ì delay of much more than a day because the waiting period requires ì that a woman seeking an abortion make at least two visits to the ì doctor. The District Court also found that in many instances ì this will increase the exposure of women seeking abortions to the ì harassment and hostility of anti-abortion protestors ì demonstrating outside a clinic. 744 F. Supp., at 1351. As a ì result, the District Court found that for those women who have ì the fewest financial resources, those who must travel long ì distances, and those who have difficulty explaining their ì whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others, the 24-hour ì waiting period will be particularly burdensome. Id., at 1352. These findings are troubling in some respects, but they ì do not demonstrate that the waiting period constitutes an undue ≡7É3 ìèburden. We do not doubt that, as the District Court held, the ì waiting period has the effect of increasing the cost and risk of ì delay of abortions, id., at 1378, but the District Court did not ì conclude that the increased costs and potential delays amount to ì substantial obstacles. Rather, applying the trimester ì framework's strict prohibition of all regulation designed to ì promote the State's interest in potential life before viability, ì see id., at 1374, the District Court concluded that the waiting ì period does not further the state interest in maternal health and ì infringes the physician's discretion to exercise sound medical ì judgment. Id., at 1378. Yet, as we have stated, under the undue ì burden standard a State is permitted to enact persuasive measures ì which favor childbirth over abortion, even if those measures do ì not further a health interest. And while the waiting period does ì limit a physician's discretion, that is not, standing alone, a ì reason to invalidate it. In light of the construction given the ì statute's definition of medical emergency by the Court of ì Appeals, and the District Court's findings, we cannot say that ì the waiting period imposes a real health risk. /* It is unfair to rely on factual findings made under one view ì of what the law considers the relevant facts to be and then find ì that other facts were not found, proving the point under the new ì law. If the lower Court had known that the case was to be studied ì on an "undue burden" standard it might have found other facts. ì The lower Court had no way to know that the tri-mester framework ì was going out the door, and stopped there. */ We also disagree with the District Court's conclusion ì that the particularly burdensome effects of the waiting period on ì some women require its invalidation. A particular burden is not ì of necessity a substantial obstacle. Whether a burden falls on a ì particular group is a distinct inquiry from whether it is a ì substantial obstacle even as to the women in that group. And the ì District Court did not conclude that the waiting period is such ì an obstacle even for the women who are most burdened by it. ì Hence, on the record before us, and in the context of this facial ì challenge, we are not convinced that the 24-hour waiting period ì constitutes an undue burden. We are left with the argument that the various aspects of ì the informed consent requirement are unconstitutional because ì they place barriers in the way of abortion on demand. Even the ì broadest reading of Roe, however, has not suggested that there is ì a constitutional right to abortion on demand. See, e.g., Doe v. ì Bolton, 410 U. S., at 189. Rather, the right protected by Roe is ì a right to decide to terminate a pregnancy free of undue ì interference by the State. Because the informed consent ì requirement facilitates the wise exercise of that right it cannot ì be classified as an interference with the right Roe protects. ì The informed consent requirement is not an undue burden on that right. ÇÇ! C ≡7É3 è Section 3209 of Pennsylvania's abortion law provides, ì except in cases of medical emergency, that no physician shall ì perform an abortion on a married woman without receiving a signed ì statement from the woman that she has notified her spouse that ì she is about to undergo an abortion. The woman has the option of ì providing an alternative signed statement certifying that her ì husband is not the man who impregnated her; that her husband ì could not be located; that the pregnancy is the result of spousal ì sexual assault which she has reported; or that the woman believes ì that notifying her husband will cause him or someone else to ì inflict bodily injury upon her. A physician who performs an ì abortion on a married woman without receiving the appropriate ì signed statement will have his or her license revoked, and is ì liable to the husband for damages. The District Court heard the testimony of numerous expert ì witnesses, and made detailed findings of fact regarding the ì effect of this statute. These included: 273. The vast majority of women consult their husbands ì prior to deciding to terminate their pregnancy. . . . . . . . . "279. The `bodily injury' exception could not be invoked ì by a married woman whose husband, if notified, would, in her ì reasonable belief, threaten to (a) publicize her intent to have ì an abortion to family, friends or acquaintances; (b) retaliate ì against her in future child custody or divorce proceedings; (c) ì inflict psychological intimidation or emotional harm upon her, ì her children or other persons; (d) inflict bodily harm on other ì persons such as children, family members or other loved ones; or ì (e) use his control over finances to deprive of necessary monies ì for herself or her children. . . . . . . . . "281. Studies reveal that family violence occurs in two ì million families in the United States. This figure, however, is ì a conservative one that substantially understates (because ì battering is usually not reported until it reaches ì life-threatening proportions) the actual number of families ì affected by domestic violence. In fact, researchers estimate ì that one of every two women will be battered at some time in ì their life. . . . "282. A wife may not elect to notify her husband of her ì intention to have an abortion for a variety of reasons, including ì the husband's illness, concernabout her own health, the imminent ì failure of the marriage, or the husband's absolute opposition to ì the abortion. . . . "283. The required filing of the spousal consent form ì would require plaintiff-clinics to change their counseling ì procedures and force women to reveal their most intimate ì decision-making on pain of criminal sanctions. The ì confidentiality of these revelations could not be guaranteed, ≡7É3 ìèsince the woman's records are not immune from subpoena. . . . "284. Women of all class levels, educational ì backgrounds, and racial, ethnic and religious groups are ì battered. . . . "285. Wife-battering or abuse can take on many physical ì and psychological forms. The nature and scope of the battering ì can cover a broad range of actions and be gruesome and ì torturous. . . . "286. Married women, victims of battering, have been ì killed in Pennsylvania and through- out the United States. . . . "287. Battering can often involve a substantial amount ì of sexual abuse, including marital rape and sexual ì mutilation. . . . "288. In a domestic abuse situation, it is common for ì the battering husband to also abuse the children in an attempt to ì coerce the wife. . . . "289. Mere notification of pregnancy is frequently a ì flashpoint for battering and violence within the family. The ì number of battering incidents is high during the pregnancy and ì often the worst abuse can be associated with pregnancy. . . . ì The battering husband may deny parentage and use the pregnancy as ì an excuse for abuse. . . . "290. Secrecy typically shrouds abusive families. ì Family members are instructed not to tell anyone, especially ì police or doctors, about the abuse and violence. Battering ì husbands often threaten their wives or her children with further ì abuse if she tells an outsider of the violence and tells her that ì nobody will believe her. A battered woman, therefore, is highly ì unlikely to disclose the violence against her for fear of ì retaliation by the abuser. . . . "291. Even when confronted directly by medical personnel ì or other helping professionals, battered women often will not ì admit to the battering because they have not admitted to ì themselves that they are battered. . . . . . . . . "294. A woman in a shelter or a safe house unknown to ì her husband is not `reasonably likely' to have bodily harm ì inflicted upon her by her batterer, however her attempt to notify ì her husband pursuant to section 3209 could accidentally disclose ì her whereabouts to her husband. Her fear of future ramifications ì would be realistic under the circumstances. "295. Marital rape is rarely discussed with others or ì reported to law enforcement authorities, and of those reported ì only few are prosecuted. . . . ≡7É3 è "296. It is common for battered women to have sexual ì intercourse with their husbands to avoid being battered. While ì this type of coercive sexual activity would be spousal sexual ì assault as defined by the Act, many women may not consider it to ì be so and others would fear disbelief. . . . "297. The marital rape exception to section 3209 cannot ì be claimed by women who are victims of coercive sexual behavior ì other than penetration. The 90-day reporting requirement of the ì spousal sexual assault statute, 18 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. 3218(c), ì further narrows the class of sexually abused wives who can claim ì the exception, since many of these women may be psychologically ì unable to discuss or report the rape for several years after the ì incident. . . . "298. Because of the nature of the battering ì relationship, battered women are unlikely to avail themselves of ì the exceptions to section 3209 of the Act, regardless of whether ì the section applies to them." 744 F. Supp., at 1360-1362. These findings are supported by studies of domestic ì violence. The American Medical Association (AMA) has published a ì summary of the recent research in this field, which indicates ì that in an average 12-month period in this country, approximately ì two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their ì male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one ì of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past ì year. The AMA views these figures as .lm 1.00" há marked underestimates, because the nature of these ì á incidents discourages women from reporting them, and ì á because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those ì á who do not speak English well, and women who are ì á homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the ì á survey is conducted. Accord- ing to the AMA, ì á [r]esearchers on family violence agree that the true ì á incidence of partner violence is probably double the ì á above estimates; or four million severely assaulted ì á women per year. Studies suggest that from one-fifth to ì á one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by ì á a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime. AMA ì á Council on Scientific Affairs, Violence Against Women 7 ì á (1991) (emphasis in original). .lm 0.00" Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women ì are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these ì incidents involve sexual assault. Id., at 3-4; Shields & ì Hanneke, Battered Wives' Reactions to Marital Rape, in The Dark ì Side of Families: Current Family Violence Research 131, 144 (D. ì Finkelhor, R. Gelles, G. Hataling, & M. Straus eds. 1983). In ì families where wife-beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is ì often present as well. Violence Against Women, supra, at 12. Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. ì Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. ≡7É3 ìèPsychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic ì isolation of women, is also common. L. Walker, The Battered ì Woman Syndrome 27-28 (1984). Many victims of domestic violence ì remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no ì superior alternative. Herbert, Silver, & Ellard, Coping with an ì Abusive Relationship: I. How and Why do Women Stay?, 53 J. ì Marriage & the Family 311 (1991). Many abused women who find ì temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large ì part because they have no other source of income. Aguirre, Why ì Do They Return? Abused Wives in Shelters, 30 J. Nat. Assn. of ì Social Workers 350, 352 (1985). Returning to one's abuser can be ì dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics ì disclose that 8.8% of all homicide victims in the United States ì are killed by their spouse. Mercy & Saltzman, Fatal Violence ì Among Spouses in the United States, 1976-85, 79 Am. J. Public ì Health 595 (1989). Thirty percent of female homicide victims are ì killed by their male partners. Domestic Violence: Terrorism in ì the Home, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Children, Family, ì Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human ì Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1990). The limited research that has been conducted with respect ì to notifying one's husband about an abortion, although involving ì samples too small to be representative, also supports the ì District Court's findings of fact. The vast majority of women ì notify their male partners of their decision to obtain an ì abortion. In many cases in which married women do not notify ì their husbands, the pregnancy is the result of an extramarital ì affair. Where the husband is the father, the primary reason ì women do not notify their husbands is that the husband and wife ì are experiencing marital difficulties, often accompanied by ì incidents of violence. Ryan & Plutzer, When Married Women Have ì Abortions: Spousal Notification and Marital Interaction, 51 J. ì Marriage & the Family 41, 44 (1989). This information and the District Court's findings ì reinforce what common sense would suggest. In well-functioning ì marriages, spouses discuss important intimate decisions such as ì whether to bear a child. But there are millions of women in this ì country who are the victims of regular physical and psychological ì abuse at the hands of their husbands. Should these women become ì pregnant, they may have very good reasons for not wishing to ì inform their husbands of their decision to obtain an abortion. ì Many may have justifiable fears of physical abuse, but may be no ì less fearful of the consequences of reporting prior abuse to the ì Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Many may have a reasonable fear ì that notifying their husbands will provoke further instances of ì child abuse; these women are not exempt from 3209's notification ì requirement. Many may fear devastating forms of psychological ì abuse from their husbands, including verbal harassment, threats ì of future violence, the destruction of possessions, physical ì confinement to the home, the withdrawal of financial support, or ì the disclosure of the abortion to family and friends. These ì methods of psychological abuse may act as even more of a ì deterrent to notification than the possibility of physical ≡7É3 ìèviolence, but women who are the victims of the abuse are not ì exempt from 3209's notification requirement. And many women who ì are pregnant as a result of sexual assaults by their husbands ì will be unable to avail themselves of the exception for spousal ì sexual assault, 3209(b)(3), because the exception requires that ì the woman have notified law enforcement authorities within 90 ì days of the assault, and her husband will be notified of her ì report once an investigation begins. 3128(c). If anything in ì this field is certain, it is that victims of spousal sexual ì assault are extremely reluctant to report the abuse to the ì government; hence, a great many spousal rape victims will not be ì exempt from the notification requirement imposed by 3209. The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to ì prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion. ì It does not merely make abortions a little more difficult or ì expensive to obtain; for many women, it will impose a substantial ì obstacle. We must not blind ourselves to the fact that the ì significant number of women who fear for their safety and the ì safety of their children are likely to be deterred from procuring ì an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed ì abortion in all cases. Respondents attempt to avoid the conclusion that 3209 is ì invalid by pointing out that it imposes almost no burden at all ì for the vast majority of women seeking abortions. They begin by ì noting that only about 20 percent of the women who obtain ì abortions are married. They then note that of these women about ì 95 percent notify their husbands of their own volition. Thus, ì respondents argue, the effects of 3209 are felt by only one ì percent of the women who obtain abortions. Respondents argue ì that since some of these women will be able to notify their ì husbands without adverse consequences or will qualify for one of ì the exceptions, the statute affects fewer than one percent of ì women seeking abortions. For this reason, it is asserted, the ì statute cannot be invalid on its face. See Brief for Respondents 83-86. We disagree with respondents' basic method of analysis. The analysis does not end with the one percent of women ì upon whom the statute operates; it begins there. Legislation is ì measured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on ì those whose conduct it affects. For example, we would not say ì that a law which requires a newspaper to print a candidate's ì reply to an unfavorable editorial is valid on its face because ì most newspapers would adopt the policy even absent the law. See ì Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). ì The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom ì the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is ì irrelevant. Respondents' argument itself gives implicit recognition ì to this principle, at one of its critical points. Respondents ì speak of the one percent of women seeking abortions who are ì married and would choose not to notify their husbands of their plans. By selecting as the controlling class women who ≡7É3 ìèwish to obtain abortions, rather than all women or all pregnant ì women, respondents in effect concede that 3209 must be judged by ì reference to those for whom it is an actual rather than ì irrelevant restriction. Of course, as we have said, 3209's real ì target is narrower even than the class of women seeking abortions ì identified by the State: it is married women seeking abortions ì who do not wish to notify their husbands of their intentions and ì who do not qualify for one of the statutory exceptions to the ì notice requirement. The unfortunate yet persisting conditions we ì document above will mean that in a large fraction of the cases in ì which 3209 is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle ì to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion. It is an undue ì burden, and therefore invalid. This conclusion is in no way inconsistent with our ì decisions upholding parental notification or consent ì requirements. See, e.g., Akron II, 497 U.S., at ---; Bellotti v. ì Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II); Planned Parenthood of ì Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 74. Those enactments, ì and our judgment that they are constitutional, are based on the ì quite reasonable assumption that minors will benefit from ì consultation with their parents and that children will often not ì realize that their parents have their best interests at heart. ì We cannot adopt a parallel assumption about adult women. We recognize that a husband has a deep and proper concern ì and interest . . . in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and ì development of the fetus she is carrying. Danforth, supra, at 69. ì With regard to the children he has fathered and raised, the Court ì has recognized his cognizable and substantial interest in their ì custody. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-652 (1972); see ì also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246 (1978); Caban v. ì Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248 ì (1983). If this case concerned a State's ability to require the ì mother to notify the father before taking some action with ì respect to a living child raised by both, therefore, it would be ì reasonable to conclude as a general matter that the father's ì interest in the welfare of the child and the mother's interest ì are equal. Before birth, however, the issue takes on a very ì different cast. It is an inescapable biological fact that state ì regulation with respect to the child a woman is carrying will ì have a far greater impact on the mother's liberty than on the ì father- 's. The effect of state regulation on a woman's ì protected liberty is doubly deserving of scrutiny in such a case, ì as the State has touched not only upon the private sphere of the ì family but upon the very bodily integrity of the pregnant woman. ì Cf. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S., at ì 281. The Court has held that when the wife and the husband ì disagree on this decision, the view of only one of the two ì marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman who ì physically bears the child and who is the more directly and ì immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the ì balance weighs in her favor. Danforth, supra, at 71. This ≡7É3 ìèconclusion rests upon the basic nature of marriage and the nature ì of our Constitution: [T]he marital couple is not an independent ì entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of ì two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional ì makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right ì of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted ì governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a ì person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. ì Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S., at 453 (emphasis in original). ì The Constitution protects individuals, men and women alike, from ì unjustified state interference, even when that interference is ì enacted into law for the benefit of their spouses. There was a time, not so long ago, when a different ì understanding of the family and of the Constitution prevailed. ì In Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130 (1873), three Members of ì this Court reaffirmed the common-law principle that a woman had ì no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as ì her head and representative in the social state; and, ì notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status, ì many of the special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon ì this cardinal principle still exist in full force in most States. ì Id., at 141 (Bradley J., joined by Swayne and Field, JJ., ì concurring in judgment). Only one generation has passed since ì this Court observed that woman is still regarded as the center of ì home and family life, with attendant special responsibilities ì that precluded full and independent legal status under the ì Constitution. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 62 (1961). These ì views, of course, are no longer consistent with our understanding ì of the family, the individual, or the Constitution. In keeping with our rejection of the common-law ì understanding of a woman's role within the family, the Court held ì in Danforth that the Constitution does not permit a State to ì require a married woman to obtain her husband's consent before ì undergoing an abortion. 428 U. S., at 69. The principles that ì guided the Court in Danforth should be our guides today. For the ì great many women who are victims of abuse inflicted by their ì husbands, or whose children are the victims of such abuse, a ì spousal notice requirement enables the husband to wield an ì effective veto over his wife's decision. Whether the prospect of ì notification itself deters such women from seeking abortions, or ì whether the husband, through physical force or psychological ì pressure or economic coercion, prevents his wife from obtaining ì an abortion until it is too late, the notice require- ment will ì often be tantamount to the veto found unconstitutional in ì Danforth. The women most affected by this law "those who most ì reasonably fear the consequences of notifying their husbands that ì they are pregnant" are in the gravest danger. The husband's interest in the life of the child his wife ì is carrying does not permit the State to empower him with this ì troubling degree of authority over his wife. The contrary view ì leads to consequences reminiscent of the common law. A husband ì has no enforceable right to require a wife to advise him before ≡7É3 ìèshe exercises her personal choices. If a husband's interest in ì the potential life of the child outweighs a wife's liberty, the ì State could require a married woman to notify her husband before ì she uses a postfertilization contraceptive. Perhaps next in line ì would be a statute requiring pregnant married women to notify ì their husbands before engaging in conduct causing risks to the ì fetus. After all, if the husband's interest in the fetus' safety ì is a sufficient predicate for state regulation, the State could ì reasonably conclude that pregnant wives should notify their ì husbands before drinking alcohol or smoking. Perhaps married ì women should notify their husbands before using contraceptives or ì before undergoing any type of surgery that may have complications ì affecting the husband's interest in his wife's reproductive ì organs. And if a husband's interest justifies notice in any of ì these cases, one might reasonably argue that it justifies exactly ì what the Danforth Court held it did not justify "a requirement of ì the husband's consent as well. A State may not give to a man the ì kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their ì children. Section 3209 embodies a view of marriage consonant with ì the common-law status of married women but repugnant to our ì present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the rights ì secured by the Constitution. Women do not lose their ì constitutionally protected liberty when they marry. The ì Constitution protects all individuals, male or female, married or ì unmarried, from the abuse of governmental power, even where that ì power is employed for the supposed benefit of a member of the ì individual's family. These considerations confirm our conclusion ì that 3209 is invalid. ÇÇ! D We next consider the parental consent provision. Except ì in a medical emergency, an unemancipated young woman under 18 may ì not obtain an abortion unless she and one of her parents (or ì guardian) provides informed consent as defined above. If neither ì a parent nor a guardian provides consent, a court may authorize ì the performance of an abortion upon a determination that the ì young woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent and ì has in fact given her informed consent, or that an abortion would ì be in her best interests. We have been over most of this ground before. Our cases ì establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a ì minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or ì guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass ì procedure. See, e.g., Akron II, 497 U. S., at ---; Hodgson, 497 ì U. S., at ---; Akron I, supra, at 440; Bellotti II, supra, at ì 643-644 (plurality opinion). Under these precedents, in our ì view, the one-parent consent requirement and judicial bypass ì procedure are constitutional. The only argument made by petitioners respecting this ì provision and to which our prior decisions do not speak is the ì contention that the parental consent requirement is invalid ì because it requires informed parental consent. For the most ≡7É3 ìèpart, petitioners' argument is a reprise of their argument with ì respect to the informed consent requirement in general, and we ì reject it for the reasons given above. Indeed, some of the ì provisions regarding informed consent have particular force with ì respect to minors: the waiting period, for example, may provide ì the parent or parents of a pregnant young woman the opportunity ì to consult with her in private, and to discuss the consequences ì of her decision in the context of the values and moral or ì religious principles of their family. See Hodgson, supra, at ì ---. ÇÇ! E Under the recordkeeping and reporting require- ments of ì the statute, every facility which performs abortions is required ì to file a report stating its name and address as well as the name ì and address of any related entity, such as a controlling or ì subsidiary organization. In the case of state-funded ì institutions, the information becomes public. For each abortion performed, a report must be filed ì identifying: the physician (and the second physician where ì required); the facility; the referring physician or agency; the ì woman's age; the number of prior pregnancies and prior abortions ì she has had; gestational age; the type of abortion procedure; the ì date of the abortion; whether there were any pre-existing medical ì conditions which would complicate pregnancy; medical ì complications with the abortion; where applicable, the basis for ì the determination that the abortion was medically necessary; the ì weight of the aborted fetus; and whether the woman was married, ì and if so, whether notice was provided or the basis for the ì failure to give notice. Every abortion facility must also file ì quarterly reports showing the number of abortions performed ì broken down by trimester. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3207, 3214 ì (1990). In all events, the identity of each woman who has had an ì abortion remains confidential. In Danforth, 428 U. S., at 80, we held that recordkeeping ì and reporting provisions that are reasonably directed to the ì preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a ì patient's confidentiality and privacy are permissible. We think ì that under this standard, all the provisions at issue here except ì that relating to spousal notice are constitutional. Although ì they do not relate to the State's interest in informing the ì woman's choice, they do relate to health. The collection of ì information with respect to actual patients is a vital element of ì medical research, and so it cannot be said that the requirements ì serve no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult. ì Nor do we find that the requirements impose a substantial ì obstacle to a woman's choice. At most they might increase the ì cost of some abortions by a slight amount. While at some point ì increased cost could become a substantial obstacle, there is no ì such showing on the record before us. Subsection (12) of the reporting provision requires the ≡7É3 ìèreporting of, among other things, a married woman's reason for ì failure to provide notice to her husband. 3214(a)(12). This ì provision in effect requires women, as a condition of obtaining ì an abortion, to provide the Commonwealth with the precise ì information we have already recognized that many women have ì pressing reasons not to reveal. Like the spousal notice ì requirement itself, this provision places an undue burden on a ì woman's choice, and must be invalidated for that reason. &&! VI Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first ì generation of Americans to us and then to future generations. It ì is a coherent succession. Each generation must learn anew that ì the Constitution's written terms embody ideas and aspirations ì that must survive more ages than one. We accept our ì responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning ì of the covenant in light of all of our precedents. We invoke it ì once again to define the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's ì own promise, the promise of liberty. * * * The judgment in No. 91-902 is affirmed. The judgment in ì No. 91-744 is affirmed in part and reversed in part,and the case ì is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion, ì including consideration of the question of severability. It is so ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION Selected Provisions of the 1988 and 1989 Amendments to the ì Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1990). "3203. Definitions. . . . . . `Medical emergency.' That condition which, on the basis ì of the physician's good faith clinical judgment, so complicates ì the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the ì immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for ì which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and ì irreversible impairment of major bodily function." "3205. Informed Consent. "(a) General Rule. " No abortion shall be performed or ì induced except with the voluntary and informed consent of the ì woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed or induced. ì Except in the case of a medical emergency, consent to an abortion ì is voluntary and informed if and only if: "(1) At least 24 hours ì prior to the abortion, the physician who is to perform the ì abortion or the referring physician has orally informed the woman ì of: "(i) The nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and of ì those risks and alternatives to the procedure or treatment that a ≡7É3 ìèreasonable patient would consider material to the decision of ì whether or not to undergo the abortion. "(ii) The probable gestational age of the unborn child at the time ì the abortion is to be performed. "(iii) The medical risks associated with carrying her child to ì term. "(2) At least 24 hours prior to the abortion, the physician who is ì to perform the abortion or the referring physician, or a ì qualified physician assistant, health care practitioner, ì technician or social worker to whom the responsibility has been ì delegated by either physician, has informed the pregnant woman ì that: "(i) The department publishes printed materials which ì describe the unborn child and list agencies which offer ì alternatives to abortion and that she has a right to review the ì printed materials and that a copy will be provided to her free of ì charge if she chooses to review it. "(ii) Medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal ì care, childbirth and neonatal care, and that more detailed ì information on the availability of such assistance is contained ì in the printed materials published by the department. "(iii) The father of the unborn child is liable to assist in the ì support of her child, even in instances where he has offered to ì pay for the abortion. In the case of rape, this information may ì be omitted. /* Does the statute also point out that child support is not ì collected in many cases? */ "(3) A copy of the printed materials has been provided to the ì woman if she chooses to view these materials. "(4) The pregnant woman certifies in writing, prior to the ì abortion, that the information required to be provided under ì para- graphs (1), (2) and (3) has been provided. "(b) Emergency. ì " Where a medical emergency compels the performance of an ì abortion, the physician shall inform the woman, prior to the ì abortion if possible, of the medical indications supporting his ì judgment that an abortion is necessary to avert her death or to ì avert substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily ì function. "(c) Penalty. " Any physician who violates the provisions ì of this section is guilty of `unprofessional conduct' and his ì license for the practice of medicine and surgery shall be subject ì to suspension or revocation in accordance with procedures ì provided under the act of October 5, 1978 (P.L. 1109, No. 261), ì known as the Osteopathic Medical Practice Act, the act of ì December 20, 1985 (P.L. 457, No. 112), known as the Medical ì Practice Act of 1985, or their successor acts. Any physician who ì performs or induces an abortion without first obtaining the ≡7É3 ìècertification required by subsection (a)(4) or with knowledge or ì reason to know that the informed consent of the woman has not ì been obtained shall for the first offense be guilty of a summary ì offense and for each subsequent offense be guilty of a ì misdemeanor of the third degree. No physician shall be guilty of ì violating this section for failure to furnish the information ì required by subsection (a) if he or she can demonstrate, by a ì preponderance of the evidence, that he or she reasonably believed ì that furnishing the information would have resulted in a severely ì adverse effect on the physical or mental health of the patient. "(d) Limitation on Civil Liability. " Any physician who ì complies with the provisions of this section may not be held ì civilly liable to his patient for failure to obtain informed ì consent to the abortion within the meaning of that term as ì defined by the act of October 15, 1975 (P.L. 390, No. 111), known ì as the Health Care Services Malpractice Act." "3206. Parental ì Consent. "(a) General rule. " Except in the case of a medical ì emergency or except as provided in this section, if a pregnant ì woman is less than 18 years of age and not emancipated, or if she ì has been adjudged an incompetent under 20 Pa. C.S. 5511 (relating ì to petition and hearing; examination by court-appointed ì physician), a physician shall not perform an abortion upon her ì unless, in the case of a woman who is less than 18 years of age, ì he first obtains the informed consent both of the pregnant woman ì and of one of her parents; or, in the case of a woman who is ì incompetent, he first obtains the informed consent of her ì guardian. In deciding whether to grant such consent, a preg- ì nant woman's parent or guardian shall consider only their child's ì or ward's best interests. In the case of a pregnancy that is the ì result of incest, where the father is a party to the incestuous ì act, the pregnant woman need only obtain the consent of her ì mother. "(b) Unavailability of parent or guardian. " If both ì parents have died or are otherwise unavailable to the physician ì within a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, consent of ì the pregnant woman's guardian or guardians shall be sufficient. ì If the pregnant woman's parents are divorced, consent of the ì parent having custody shall be sufficient. If neither any parent ì nor a legal guardian is available to the physician within a ì reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, consent of any adult ì person standing in loco parentis shall be sufficient. "(c) Petition to the court for consent. " If both of the ì parents or guardians of the pregnant woman refuse to consent to ì the performance of an abortion or if she elects not to seek the ì consent of either of her parents or of her guardian, the court of ì common pleas of the judicial district in which the applicant ì resides or in which the abortion is sought shall, upon petition ì or motion, after an appropriate hearing, authorize a physician to ì perform the abortion if the court determines that the pregnant ì woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent to the ≡7É3 ìèpro- posed abortion, and has, in fact, given such consent. "(d) Court order. " If the court determines that the ì pregnant woman is not mature and capable of giving informed ì consent or if the pregnant woman does not claim to be mature and ì capable of giving informed consent, the court shall determine ì whether the performance of an abortion upon her would be in her ì best interests. If the court determines that the performance of ì an abortion would be in the best interests of the woman, it shall ì authorize a physician to perform the abortion. "(e) Representation in proceedings. " The pregnant woman ì may participate in proceedings in the court on her own behalf and ì the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to assist her. The ì court shall, however, advise her that she has a right to court ì appointed counsel, and shall provide her with such counsel unless ì she wishes to appear with private counsel or has knowingly and ì intelligently waived representation by counsel." "3207. Abortion Facilities. . . . . . "(b) Reports. " Within 30 days after the effective date ì of this chapter, every facility at which abortions are performed ì shall file, and update immediately upon any change, a report with ì the department, containing the following information: "(1)Name ì and address of the facility. "(2)Name and address of any parent, subsidiary or affiliated ì organizations, corporations or associations. "(3)Name and address of any parent, subsidiary or affiliated ì organizations, corporations or associations having contempo- ì raneous commonality of ownership, beneficial interest, ì directorship or officership with any other facility. The information contained in those reports which are filed ì pursuant to this subsection by facilities which receive ì State-appropriated funds during the 12-calendar-month period ì immediately preceding a request to inspect or copy such reports ì shall be deemed public information. Reports filed by facilities ì which do not receive State-appropriated funds shall only be ì available to law enforcement officials, the State Board of ì Medicine and the State Board of Osteopathic Medicine for use in ì the performance of their official duties. Any facility failing ì to comply with the provisions of this subsection shall be ì assessed by the department a fine of $500 for each day it is in ì violation hereof." "3208. Printed Information. "(a) General Rule. " The department shall cause to be ì published in English, Spanish and Vietnamese, within 60 days ì after this chapter becomes law, and shall update on an annual ì basis, the following easily comprehensible printed materials: ì "(1)Geographically indexed materials designed to inform the woman ì of public and private agencies and services available to assist a ì woman through pregnancy, upon child- birth and while the child is ì dependent, including adoption agencies, which shall include a ≡7É3 ìècomprehensive list of the agencies available, a description of ì the services they offer and a description of the manner, ì including telephone numbers, in which they might be contacted, ì or, at the option of the department, printed materials including ì a toll-free 24-hour a day telephone number which may be called to ì obtain, orally, such a list and description of agencies in the ì locality of the caller and of the services they offer. The ì materials shall provide information on the availability of ì medical assistance benefits for prenatal care, childbirth and ì neonatal care, and state that it is unlawful for any individual ì to coerce a woman to undergo abortion, that any physician who ì performs an abortion upon a woman without obtaining her informed ì consent or without according her a private medical consultation ì may be liable to her for damages in a civil action at law, that ì the father of a child is liable to assist in the support of that ì child, even in instances where the father has offered to pay for ì an abortion and that the law permits adoptive parents to pay ì costs of prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care. "(2) Materials designed to inform the woman of the probable ì anatomical and physiological characteristics of the unborn child ì at two-week gestational increments from fertilization to full ì term, including pictures representing the development of unborn ì children at two-week gestational increments, and any relevant ì information on the possibility of the unborn child's survival; ì provided that any such pictures or drawings must contain the ì dimensions of the fetus and must be realistic and appropriate for ì the woman's stage of pregnancy. The materials shall be ì objective, non-judgmental and designed to convey only accurate ì scientific information about the unborn child at the various ì gestational ages. The material shall also contain objective ì information describing the methods of abortion procedures ì commonly employed, the medical risks commonly associated with ì each such procedure, and the medical risks commonly associated ì with carrying a child to term. "(b)Format. " The materials shall be printed in a typeface large ì enough to be clearly legible. "(c)Free distribution. " The materials required under this ì section shall be available at no cost from the department upon ì request and in appropriate number to any person, facility or ì hospital." "3209. Spousal Notice. "(a) Spousal notice required. " In order to further the ì Commonwealth's interest in promoting the integrity of the marital ì relationship and to protect a spouse's interests in having ì children within marriage and in protecting the prenatal life of ì that spouse's child, no physician shall perform an abortion on a ì married woman, except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), ì unless he or she has received a signed statement, which need not ì be notarized, from the woman upon whom the abortion is to be ì performed, that she has notified her spouse that she is about to ≡7É3 ìèundergo an abortion. The statement shall bear a notice that any ì false statement made therein is punishable by law. "(b) Exceptions. " The statement certifying that the ì notice required by subsection (a) has been given need not be ì furnished where the woman provides the physician a signed ì statement certi- fying at least one of the following: "(1) Her spouse is not the father of the child. "(2)Her spouse, ì after diligent effort, could not be located. "(3)The pregnancy is a result of spousal sexual assault as ì described in section 3128 (relating to spousal sexual assault), ì which has been reported to a law enforcement agency having the ì requisite jurisdiction. "(4)The woman has reason to believe that the furnishing of notice ì to her spouse is likely to result in the infliction of bodily ì injury upon her by her spouse or by another individual. Such statement need not be notarized, but shall bear a notice ì that any false statements made therein are punishable by law. "(c) Medical emergency. " The requirements of subsection (a) ì shall not apply in case of a medical emergency. "(d) Forms. " The department shall cause to be published, forms ì which may be utilized for purposes of providing the signed ì statements required by subsections (a) and (b). The department ì shall distribute an adequate supply of such forms to all abortion ì facilities in this Commonwealth. "(e) Penalty; civil action. " Any physician who violates the ì provisions of this section is guilty of `unprofessional conduct,' ì and his or her license for the practice of medicine and surgery ì shall be subject to suspension or revocation in accordance with ì procedures provided under the act of October 5, 1978 (P.L. 1109, ì No. 261), known as the Osteopathic Medical Practice Act, the act ì of December 20, 1985 (P.L. 457, No. 112), known as the Medical ì Practice Act of 1985, or their successor acts. In addition, any ì physician who knowingly violates the provisions of this section ì shall be civilly liable to the spouse who is the father of the ì aborted child for any damages caused thereby and for punitive ì damages in the amount of $5,000, and the court shall award a ì prevailing plaintiff a reasonable attorney fee as part of costs." "3214. Reporting. "(a) General rule. " For the purpose of promotion of maternal ì health and life by adding to the sum of medical and public health ì knowledge through the compilation of relevant data, and to ì promote the Commonwealth's interest in protection of the unborn ì child, a report of each abortion performed shall be made to the ì department on forms prescribed by it. The report forms shall not ì identify the individual patient by name and shall include the ì following information: ≡7É3 è"(1) Identification of the physician who performed the abortion, ì the concurring physician as required by section 3211(c-) (2) (relating to abortion on unborn child of 24 or more weeks ì gestational age), the second physician as required by section ì 3211(c)(5) and the facility where the abortion was performed and ì of the referring physician, agency or service, if any. "(2)The county and state in which the woman resides. "(3)The woman's age. "(4)The number of prior pregnancies and prior abortions of the ì woman. "(5)The gestational age of the unborn child at the time of the ì abortion. "(6)The type of procedure performed or prescribed and the date of ì the abortion. "(7)Pre-existing medical conditions of the woman which would ì complicate pregnancy, if any, and if known, any medical ì complication which resulted from the abortion itself. "(8)The basis for the medical judgment of the physician who ì performed the abortion that the abortion was necessary to prevent ì either the death of the pregnant woman or the substantial and ì irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the woman, ì where an abortion has been performed pursuant to section ì 3211(b)(1). "(9)The weight of the aborted child for any abortion performed ì pursuant to section 3211(b)(1). "(10)Basis for any medical judgment that a medical emergency ì existed which excused the physician from compliance with any ì provision of this chapter. "(11)The information required to be reported under section ì 3210(a) (relating to determination of gestational age). "(12)Whether the abortion was performed upon a married woman and, ì if so, whether notice to her spouse was given. If no notice to ì her spouse was given, the report shall also indicate the reason ì for failure to provide notice. . . . . . "(f) Report by facility. " Every facility in which an abortion is ì performed within this Commonwealth during any quarter year shall ì file with the department a report showing the total number of ì abortions performed within the hospital or other facility during ì that quarter year. This report shall also show the total ì abortions performed in each trimester of pregnancy. Any report ì shall be available for public inspection and copying only if the ≡7É3 ìèfacility receives State-appropriated funds within the ì 12-calendar-month period immediately preceding the filing of the ì report. These reports shall be submitted on a form prescribed by ì the department which will enable a facility to indicate whether ì or not it is receiving State-appropriated funds. If the facility ì indicates on the form that it is not receivingState-appropriated ì funds, the department shall regard its report as confidential ì unless it receives other evidence which causes it to conclude ì that the facility receives State-appropriated funds."